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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates agriculture-related loan default in 2002–2009 through a large
data set from a leading Chinese state-owned bank. Using logit regression, we find
the default rate on agriculture-related loans is significantly higher than that on non–
agriculture-related loans. We find that base interest rates, loan maturity, the type
of collateral, firm size, ownership structure, and managerial quality rating have a
significant impact on agriculture-related loan default, but this also depends on how
agriculture-related loans are defined. The results provide insight into the real impact
of monetary policy on agriculture-related lending.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As in many emerging economies, rapid economic growth and industrialization have
created an ever-widening gap between urban and rural areas in China in terms of
wealth, infrastructure, and public services (Gan et al., 2014; Yin et al., 2019). Because
of the large rural population and the implications of underdeveloped rural areas
for social stability, the Chinese government, as in many other emerging markets
(Savitha and Kumar, 2016; Dorfleitner et al., 2017), has been giving attention as
well as priority to the development of rural areas, food security, and improving
the income of the rural population (or “san nong” in the context of Chinese).1 One of
the most influential policies has been to encourage financial institutions to expand
their lending to agriculture-related sectors (Ayygari et al., 2010). Agriculturerelated loans are therefore pivotal to rural development in China.
Using a unique database obtained directly from a Chinese leading bank, this
paper examines the determinants of agriculture-related loan default. Following
Yin et al. (2014) and Yin et al. (2019), we apply a hazard model by conducting
logit regressions. We find agriculture-related loans are more likely to result in
default than non–agriculture-related loans, after controlling for loan contracts,
firms, macroeconomics, and weather factors. Besides, agriculture-related sectors
could have country-specific characteristics relating to default, and a international
standard definition might not be applicable to single country. In addition, we
find loan-specific rates and base interest rates co-determine the default rate of
agricultural loans. Furthermore, the redefinition of default would generally affect
the influence of contract-specific characteristics on the default of all types of loans.
Our findings contribute to the literature by identifying distinguishing features
between agricultural loans and loans in general. They also provide further insight
into agricultural-related loans based on the work of Yin et al. (2019).
The motivation for investigating the determinants of default on agriculturerelated loans is as follows. First, the amounts involved in agriculture-related loans
are enormous. By the end of 2014, outstanding agriculture-related loans stood at
RMB 23.6 trillion (USD 3.8 trillion), accounting for 29% of all outstanding loans in
China.2 Compared to 2010, not only did size of agriculture-related loans double, but
also its proportion of all outstanding loans rose by 4% (Ouyang and Zhang, 2019).
Second, agricultural financial risk is substantial (Morgan et al., 2012). Because of
the characteristics of the agricultural sector and the underdevelopment of rural
areas in China, agriculture-related loans involve higher costs, longer periods, and
higher risks compared to bank lending in other sectors. Therefore, as the amount
of agriculture-related loans grows, attention has been drawn to the quality of this
asset class. Third, as a result of the previous point, subsidies are injected into the
market to encourage financial institutions to engage in agriculture-related loans.3
This leads to the issue of efficiency, i.e., whether the credit risk on agriculture-related
loans is fully understood and well managed by state-owned or state-controlled
1

2
3

These refer to the long-term policy of the Chinese government called the Three Issues, or san nong
(三农). San nong is the abbreviation for increasing agricultural production, increasing farmers’
income, and developing rural areas.
See also the Quarterly Executive Report of Monetary Policy, People’s Bank of China.
See “30% growth in agriculture-related loans and the hidden danger in the subsidised model for
growth,” The Economic Observer, October 17, 2011.
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banks when executing san nong policies. This is a concern for policymakers and
critical to the sustainable development of this market (Xie and Jin, 2015). Fourth,
the literature on loan default involves the determinants of default, the effect of
collateral on default, and the heterogeneity of borrowers (Savitha and Kumar,
2016; Zhou et al., 2016; Yin et al., 2019). There is a dearth of literature dedicated to
the sector-specific credit quality of loans, particularly loans in emerging markets.
Finally, in an era of high output volatility of agricultural products, this study of
one of the largest agricultural producers is also of general interest to the world
community in terms of managing food supply and food security.4
This paper contributes to the literature by filling the void in studies dedicated
to bank lending in the agricultural sector. The findings reveal the key determinants
of the credit quality of agriculture-related loans that inform the business operations
of banking institutions. We are specifically interested in two sets of variables that
are particularly important in agricultural loans: agriculturally related factors (e.g.,
temperature and rainfall) and loan-specific interest rates. Indeed, we find that the
two sets of variables significantly determine the default rate in this unique sector.
We also provide insight for emerging economies on the financial risk in policyoriented lending to the agriculture sector.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature related to
loan default. Section III presents the methodology and data. Section IV interprets
the results on the default of agriculture-related loans relative to other types of
loan. It also conducts robustness tests. Section V analyzes the determinants of
agriculture-related loan default, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Determinants of Bank Loan Default
Identification of the determinants of bank loan default can be traced to Campbell
and Dietrich (1983), who use US bank loan data to find that the ratio of concurrent
payments to revenue, the loan-to-value ratio, the unemployment rate, loan
maturity, and the initial loan-to-value ratio have a significant influence on the loan
default rate. Berger and De Young (1997) use Granger causality tests and find that,
when a bank’s capital decreases, the amount of bad loans increases, and there is
a bilateral intertemporal relation between the quality of loans and cost efficiency.
In addition, cost efficiency is one of the most important factors for predicting bad
loans and failing banks.
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) argue that the credit risk with corporations is greater
than with non-corporations, i.e., partnerships and sole proprietors involve less
moral hazard. Berger and De Young (2001, 2006) suggest that geographic distance
increases the costs of information collection and monitoring such that the loan
default rate increases with the distance between the borrower and the lender.
Jiménez and Saurina (2004) analyze more than 3 million individual loans in Spain
between 1988 and 2000 and find that the default rate on collateralized loans is
higher than for unsecured loans. They also find that savings banks tend to extend
4

According to the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization, China is the largest
producer of wheat, rice, and so forth.
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loans with higher credit risk and that closer banking relationships between banks
and firms increase bank risk taking.
Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2005) find that an information-based loan lending
model can reduce the inefficiency caused by geographic distance, and lenders who
use credit scoring models face a lower default rate. Conversely, Rossi (1998) and
Flannery and Samolyk (2006) find that an automated lending model is associated
with economies of scale, and lending at the breakeven point of credit rating models
would lead to a higher default rate. De Young, Glennon, and Nigro (2008) find that
longer distances and lower credit ratings lead to a higher probability of default.
Jiménez and Saurina (2009) find that default rates are highly correlated with
economic cycles. In addition, the credit losses on manufacturing, construction,
consumer, and collateralized loans are generally higher. However, Sha and Wang
(2019) find that, as long as the debtor’s financial information is controlled for,
there is no industry effect in determining US default, challenging the intuition
that macroeconomic conditions have predictive power for default. Using a microlevel Chinese bank loan database, Yin et al. (2019) reach the same conclusion, that
borrower heterogeneity dilutes sensitivity to economic change in co-determining
loan default.
In sum, previous research has identified various determinants influencing
bank loan default. The role of macroeconomic conditions, previously recognized
as a determinant of loan default, is now being challenged with new evidence from
various countries. Most of the literature relies on bank-level consolidated data to
conducting analyses, and few studies use contract- or individual-level data. Given
that the decision to default is ultimately made by the borrower, and not the bank,
data obtained directly from the borrower could provide a clearer picture in this
research field.
B. Role of Collateral
Many studies focus on the impact of collateral on the default rate. Stigliz and Weiss
(1981) and Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1987) argue that banks’ requirement
for collateral when providing loans reduces the adverse selection problem, which,
in turn, leads to a lower default rate. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and La Porta et al.
(1998) suggest that, according to creditability threat theory, collateral is an effective
tool to guarantee borrowers’ good behavior.
Smith and Warner (1979) suggest moral hazard as a determinant of collateral use
in loan lending, i.e., collateralized debt prevents the borrower from swapping high
quality assetsto low quality assets, and ties up funds that could otherwise be use to
finance from projects. Chan and Kanatas (1985) consider the situation in which the
borrower cannot change the returns of the lender, i.e., in a perfectly competitive
risk-neutral credit market with no moral hazard. When the creditworthiness of
the lender and that of the borrower are identical, there is no need for collateral.
Besanko and Thakor (1987), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Manove, Padilla,
and Pagano (2001) argue that, when firms use external assets as collateral, banks
can obtain repayment upon default. This affects borrowers’ motivation of technical
default and reduces adverse selection. Collateral can substitute for the determinant
of the quality of the project to be financed. Jiménez and Saurina (2004) also find
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss0/7
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a negative relationship between the quality of collateral and the credit risk of
borrowers. Jiménez et al. (2014) find that lower short-term interest rates encourage
small-cap banks to provide more loans to risky firms without collateral, likely
leading to greater levels of default. Chen and Lin (2016) show that government
bail-out programs reduce the default risk for banks, but indirectly increase the
default risk for borrowing firms.
Other studies find a close relationship between collateral requirements and
high credit risk in lending. Empirical research shows that collateralized loans face
higher risk. To some extent, they are called high–default probability loans (see also
Orgler, 1970; Hester, 1979); in other words these loans have a higher risk premium
(see also Berger and Udell, 1990; Booth, 1992; Booth and Chua, 2006; Angbazo,
Mein, and Sanders, 1998; however, these studies are limited to the US loan market).
Igawa and Kanatas (1990) suggest that, in an ex-ante information asymmetry
credit market, collateral will lead not only to the approval of borrowers’ loan
applications, but also to moral hazard when borrowers use the loans. Freund et al.
(1998) argue that collateral-based lending models lead to credit crises.
Manove and Padilla (1999, 2001) think that the higher the amount of collateral
required, the worse the quality of the loans (ex post credit risk), and the higher
the default rate. First, when banks receive a guarantee for loans, they will have
less motivation to filter out potentially problematic borrowers and loans. Second,
optimistic entrepreneurs usually underestimate their probability of bankruptcy
and are therefore willing to provide any collateral required to obtain funding.
Based on output, consumption, and foreign debt, Arellano’s (2008) default risk
model for emerging economies predicts that interest rates and default incentives
are higher in recessions. Li et al. (2013) show that, in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis, agricultural loan delinquency rates were consistently below banks’ overall
loan delinquency rates. Nwachukwu (2013) identifies the characteristics of the
beneficiaries of a government-sponsored agricultural loan program in Nigeria to
investigate the high default rates. Weber and Musshoff’s (2012) results suggest that,
in the Tanzanian loan market, agricultural firms have lower delinquency rates than
non-agricultural firms do. Castro and Garcia (2014) and Ouyang and Zhang (2019)
find that commodity price volatility and climate factors have a modest impact on
agricultural loans, while macroeconomic conditions for the agricultural sector and
intermediate input prices have greater influence. Dinterman et al. (2018) study
how economic factors have impacted farm businesses in the United States. They
find that macroeconomic factors such as interest and unemployment rates have
strong predictive power for farm bankruptcies. Escalante et al. (2017) show that
non-white male and female farm borrowers are usually charged higher interest
rates than others, which could be attributed to lenders’ credit risk management
strategy.
Bailey et al. (2011) find that firms with poor performance are more likely
to receive bank loans, and their subsequent long-run performance is typically
poor. The authors also note negative stock market reactions, where the share
prices for Chinese borrowers typically decline significantly around bank loan
announcements. Chang et al. (2014) used a proprietary database from a large
Chinese state-owned bank to examine the usefulness of banking relationships in
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predicting loan default. They find that the contribution of banking relationships to
predicting default is greater than that of other, hard information.
In sum, the literature has documented the unique structure of agriculturalrelated bank loans under formal and informal financing channel theory. The use of
collateral and government involvement confuses the estimation of genuine credit
quality of loans in the agriculture sector. Some country-specific research provides
insights into the issue, but these studies are limited to survey data and small
samples. In lights of these limitations, Yin et al. (2019) has examined the role of
collateral played in bank loans by using large dataset from a leading commercial
bank. Using the same dataset, we are further interested in the determinants of
credit quality in the agriculture sector.
Morgan et al. (2012) and Yin et al. (2019) point out that agricultural businesses
are risky. Apart from market and business operation risks, the agriculture sector
also suffers from additional, weather-related risks. Banks exercise less monitoring
and control, because agricultural production is located in rural areas where
transportation and information collection is not so convenient. There is also a lack
of instruments that agriculture-related businesses can use to hedge these risks,
because the derivatives market is underdeveloped in China (Ouyang and Zhang,
2019). Therefore, we form two research hypotheses. The first hypothesis is as
follows.
H1: Agriculture-related loans have a higher probability of default than other
types of loans.
Consistent with works of Campbell et al. (2008), Sha and Wang (2019), and Yin
et al. (2019), the following logit model is used to examine H1:

(1)
where, the borrower i at time t, Default is a binary variable that takes the value
of zero when the loan is normal, and one if the loan goes bad (see Section 3 on
the data and variables for the definition of a bad loan, or default), and AR is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one when the loan is related to agriculture,
and zero otherwise, with AR defined according to three criteria (see also Tables
A1–A3 in the Appendix). The first criterion is set by the People’s Bank of China,
the second by the UN, while the third criterion is set by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China. Due to the broad coverage of the criterion of the People’s Bank
of China, it is widely used in the Chinese banking industry. We adopt this criterion
to classify agriculture-related loans. The other two criteria are used to check the
sensitivity of the results to the choice of agriculture-related loan classification. Due
to the higher credit risk involved in agriculture-related lending, the coefficient is
expected to bear a positive sign.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss0/7
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In line with Yin et al. (2019), we use the following loan information variables
to explain the probability of default: maturity, amount, repayment method, type
of guarantee, and interest rate, where maturity is either short, medium, or long
term.5 We introduce two dummies (MID and LONG) for the maturity of loans, i.e.,
the first one taking the value of one if the loan is medium term, and zero otherwise,
and the other taking the value of one if the loan is long term, and zero otherwise.
We use the logarithm of the loan amount as the size of the loan (Amount). The
interest rates on loans are calibrated by two variables, i.e., the logarithm of the base
interest rate (BaseIR) and the logarithm of the range of loan-specific interest rate
fluctuations (FloatIR). The repayment methods are a bullet payment at maturity
(BulletP), periodic interest payments plus principal at maturity (PeriodicP),
customized periodic repayments (CustomizedP), and standard periodic payments.
The types of guarantee include unsecured (Unsecured), guaranteed (Guaranteed),
collateralized (Collateralized), pledged (Pledged), and discounted notes (Disnotes),
which are assigned binary variables of the same name.
To examine the effect of firm-specific characteristics on the quality of loans,
following Liu et al. (2019) and Yin et al. (2019), we control for four categories of
managerial quality rating, i.e., excellent, average, restricted, and knockout, and firm
size, denoted as mega-sized (Mega), large (Large), medium sized (Medium), or small,
We also control for the ownership structure, i.e., state-owned enterprises (SOE);
collectively owned enterprises (CO); stock cooperative enterprises (SC); associated
enterprises (AE); limited liability companies (LTD); corporations (CORP); private
enterprises (PRI); foreign enterprises (FOR), including Hong Kong, Macau, and
Taiwanese enterprises; and other enterprises, including, e.g.,, sole proprietor and
partnership. These indicators are binary variables of the same name in the analyses.
We control for the size of the borrowers by classifying them as mega-sized,
large, medium sized, and small. We use the 12-month-averaged temperature
(TEMP) and precipitation (RAIN) levels in the same area as control variables for
the weather (see also Sha and Wang (2019) for a discussion on using the 12-monthaveraged value in predicting default). To control for the impact of time-varying
macroeconomic factors, we introduce year dummies, and as a residual term.
We use a logit model to estimate Equation (1). Considering that credit quality is
a discrete variable, we also use an ordered logit model to estimate Equation (1).
Monetary policy is an important systemic risk factor in determining credit
risk of loans in China, not only because a tighter monetary policy drains liquidity
for businesses, but also because it signals the arrival of a less favorable business
climate (Ayyagari et al., 2010). We thus propose the following hypothesis.
H2: Compared to changes in loan-specific interest rates, tightening in monetary
policy, i.e., an increase in base interest rates, is more likely to lead to default in
agriculture-related loans.

5

To avoid perfect collinearity, we do not include the short-term dummy variable in the regression.
Similarly, we do not include the dummy variables proxying for standard periodic payments,
unsecured guarantees, knockout ratings, “small-sized” loans, and other enterprises.
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To further investigate the determinants of agriculture-related loan default and
to test H2, we use the following model to estimate a subsample of only agriculturerelated loans:

(2)
If H2 is valid, BaseIR will have a significant, positive sign, whereas FloatIR
should be nonsignificant. The control variables include contract- and firm-specific
control variables, as well as weather variables and the year dummies, exactly as in
Equation (1).
III. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS
This paper uses corporate loan data for 2002–2009 from a leading state-owned
bank in China.6 To avoid sample selection bias, we exclude loans that were made
during this period but which will mature after 2009. In our data set, credit risk is
measured by the five categories of loan quality (in descending order), i.e., normal,
concerned, subprime, suspicious, and a loss. According to industry practice, the
last three categories are usually classified as bad loans. Therefore, we introduce a
binary variable that takes the value of one if the loan is subprime, suspicious, or
a loss, and zero otherwise. To check the sensitivity of the results to the choice of
default, we use the method of Ping and Yang (2009), reclassifying bad loans to also
include the concerned category.
The descriptive statistics (see Table 1) show that mid- and long-term loans
account for only a small proportion of the sample. The loan amount can have a
wide range. In terms of repayment types, while customized periodic payments
are rarely used, periodic and bullet payments are much more common. Loans
backed by discounted notes or collateral are much more common than guaranteed
or pledged loans. The borrowers are often small and medium-sized companies.
Using the same data set, Yin et al. (2019) find that the default rate of non–
agriculture-related loans is 6.38%, whereas that of agriculture-related loans is
much higher, at 11.6%. To further analyze the credit risk on agriculture- and nonagriculture–related loans, we compare the status of these two types of loans. While
the proportion of non–agriculture-related loans with normal status is higher
than that of agriculture-related loans (81.6% vs. 75.84%), the proportions of non–
agriculture-related loans with a lower credit quality status are smaller than those
of agriculture-related loans (Yin et al., 2014).
6

According to the bank’s request, we are restricted from disclosing further details in published
articles.
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Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables
This table reports selected descriptive statistics for all variables used in the paper. AR is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 when the loan is agriculture-related and 0 otherwise; MID and LONG are dummy variables for loans with
mid-term and long-term maturities, respectively; BaseIR is the official interest rate set by People’s Bank of China,
depending on the maturity of the loan; FloatIR is the range of loan specific interest rate changes; Amount is the log of
the amount of the loan; BulletP, PeriodicP, and CustomizedP payment are dummies for loans with these three methods of
repayment; Guaranteed, Collateralised, Pledged; and Disnotes are dummies for the types of collateral; Excellent, Averaged
and Restricted are dummies for borrowers with such managerial ratings; Mega, Large and Medium are dummies for
the size of the borrowers; SOE, CO, SC, AE, LTD, CORP, PRI, and FOR are dummies for the ownership structure of the
borrowers. TEMP and RAIN are the annual mean temperature and mean precipitation respectively.

Variable
AR
MID
LONG
BaseIR
FloatIR
Amount
BulletP
PeriodicP
CustomizedP
Guaranteed
Collateralized
Pledged
Disnotes
Excellent
Averaged
Restricted
Mega
Large
Medium
SOE
CO
SC
AE
LTD
CORP
PRI
FOR
TEMP
RAIN

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395
115395

0.1170
0.0277
0.0007
1.5840
1.4123
13.6674
0.3967
0.5806
0.0075
0.0970
0.3916
0.0348
0.4516
0.5431
0.3200
0.0613
0.0657
0.0927
0.3813
0.1015
0.0304
0.0850
0.0076
0.1903
0.1990
0.2918
0.0328
2.0475
0.0099

0.3154
0.1640
0.0262
0.3085
0.0529
1.6673
0.4892
0.4935
0.0866
0.2959
0.4881
0.1833
0.4977
0.4981
0.4665
0.2398
0.2477
0.2901
0.4857
0.3019
0.1716
0.2789
0.0870
0.3925
0.3992
0.4546
0.1781
1.1064
0.0160

0
0
0
-1.2730
-0.8210
4.6052
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.5600
0.0002

1
1
1
2.8904
2.5832
22.3327
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3.4700
0.0645

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Basic Results
The results presented in Table 2 are based on the People’s Bank of China’s definition
of agriculture-related loans. Table 2 shows a very significant positive relationship
between being agriculturally related and default, i.e., agriculture-related loans are
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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more likely to result in default than other types of loans. This result is consistent
with H1, i.e., agriculture-related loans in China are riskier and less controllable
than other types of loans.
Table 2.
Agriculture-related loans and credit risk
We report the marginal effects of Logit regression following equation (1): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βARit+γXit+μit and the
results are reported in this table. The detailed description is reported in Section III. Cluster-adjusted standard errors
are presented in parentheses. The sample period is 2002-2009.

Variables
AR
MID
LONG
BaseIR
FloatIR
Amount
BulletP
PeriodicP
CustomizedP
Guaranteed
Collateralized
Pledged
Disnotes
Excellent
Averaged
Restricted
Mega
Large
Medium
SOE
CO
SC
AE
LTD
CORP
PRI
FOR
TEMP
RAIN
Year Dummy
Observation
Pseudo R-squared

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss0/7
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v23i0

Marginal Effects

Standard Error

0.0011***
0.0033***
0.0052*
0.0047***
0.0038***
0.0001**
0.0003
0.0013
0.0018
0.0003
0.0004
-0.0001
-0.0172***
-0.0047***
-0.0019***
-0.0006***
-0.0004
-0.0015***
-0.0009***
0.0012***
0.0023***
-0.0008
0.0005***
-0.0007***
0.0007***
-0.0003*
0.0000
0.0005***
0.0372***
Yes
115269
0.283

0.0002
0.0005
0.0031
0.0006
0.0010
0.0000
0.0009
0.0009
0.0015
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003
0.0012
0.0005
0.0002
0.0001
0.0014
0.0002
0.0001
0.0003
0.0004
0.0003
0.0005
0.0002
0.0002
0.0002
0.0003
0.0001
0.0050
-
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Regarding firm-specific characteristics, medium-term loans (Medium) and
long-term loans (Long) are more likely to default than short-term loans; however,
the effect for long-term loans is weak. This finding is consistent with theory and
previous empirical studies, (e.g., Campbell and Dietrich, 1983). The base interest
rate has a positive relationship with default in logit estimation; i.e., loans granted
during a high–interest rate period are more likely to end up in default. The interest
rate float (FloatIR) has a positive relationship with loan default, i.e., interest rate
adjustments specific to large loans are associated with reduced ability to repay.
A positive relationship between the loan amount (Amount) and default is found,
i.e., the larger the loan (higher Amount), the more likely the default. However, this
relationship has only modest economic significance. In our sample, repayment
methods do not have a significant impact on loan default, although one would
expect bullet payments to be riskier than periodic repayments, since, in the former,
the entire cash flow occurs at maturity. The type of guarantee has a significant
impact on default, i.e., loans backed by discounted notes have a much lower
chance of default. Discounted notes (Disnotes) have stable value and are liquid;
therefore, the cost of default for borrowers is high. This result is consistent with the
works of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and La Porta et al (1998).
Managerial quality has a significant impact on loan default, i.e., in comparison
to firms rated excellent, average, and restricted, those with knockout ratings
(Knockout = 1) are more likely to default. This finding is intuitive, i.e., low-quality
management can make inferior decisions that can lead to the failure of the firm.
The effect of firm size on loan default is remarkable; i.e., while mega-sized firms
contribute to higher levels of default, large to medium-sized firms are less likely
to default. Regarding firm ownership structure, state-owned enterprises and
collectively owned enterprises are more likely to default. Logit estimations show
that stock cooperative, limited liability, and private firms are less likely to default.
Weather also plays a role in loan default. When TEMP and RAIN increase, the
chances of default increase accordingly. However, the effect of temperature seems
to be very modest. This result is consistent with the work of Castro and Garcia
(2014), in that warmth and rainfall contribute to agricultural production as long as
they do not surpass certain thresholds. The Year dummies have an effect on default;
however, in this paper, the main idea is for them to absorb macroeconomic factors
that are not included in our control variables.
Table 3 shows ordered logit estimations of Equation (1). The results are
consistent with those in Table 2, where agriculture-related loans have a higher
probability of default than other types of loans.
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Table 3.
Agriculture-Related Loans and Credit Risk - Ordered Logit
We report the results of Ordered Logit regression following equation (1): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βARit+γXit+μit are reported
in this table. X is the vector of control variables that are reported in Section III. The order is as the credit quality
of loans which is cut in five categories: Normal=1, Concern=2, Subprime=3, Suspicious=4 and Loss=5. Credit risk
increases with the number. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses. The sample period is 20022009.

Variables
AR
MID
LONG
BaseIR
FloatIR
Amount
TEMP
RAIN
Repayment method
Type of guarantee
Managerial rating
Size
Ownership
Year dummy
Cut1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Observations
Pseudo R-squared

Coefficients

Standard Error

0.192***
0.525***
0.860***
0.652***
2.582***
0.0659***
0.230***
5.594***
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
9.697***
11.38***
11.95***
13.20***
115,382
0.304

(0.0279)
(0.0445)
(0.200)
(0.0819)
(0.294)
(0.00800)
(0.0185)
(0.737)
(0.735)
(0.736)
(0.737)
(0.738)

B. Robustness Checks
B.1. Alternative Definitions of Agriculture-related Loans
The results in Table 4 are based on the definitions of agriculture-related loans
by the UN and by the Chinese Bureau of Statistics. When the Chinese domestic
classification is used, there is a positive relationship between the loan’s probability
of being agriculture-related and default. This positive relationship is not
statistically significant, however, when the UN classification is applied. This result
could suggest that agriculture-related sectors have country-specific characteristics
and that a international standard is not applicable. Compared to the People’s Bank
of China’s classification, alternative definitions lead to nonsignificant relationships
between interest rates and loan default. The repayment method, type of guarantee,
firm size, ownership structure, management ratings, and time have very similar
effects on loan default, regardless of how agriculture-related loans are defined.
Generally, agriculture-related loans are more likely to result in default than non–
agriculture-related loans are.
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Table 4.
Agriculture-Related Loans and Credit Risk – Alternative Definition of AgricultureRelated Loan
We estimate the equation (1): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βARit+γXit+μit following two standard that defining agricultural loans
in China and in UN (see Table A and B in the APPENDIX for details). The table reports coefficients of two regressions.
The detailed description is reported in section 3.1. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses. The
sample period is 2002-2009.

Variables
AR
MID
LONG
BaseIR
FloatIR
Amount
TEMP
RAIN
Repayment method
Type of guarantee
Managerial rating
Size
Ownership
Year dummy
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R-squared

Domestic classification of
economic sectors (1)

United Nations
classification of sectors (2)

0.020**
(0.010)
0.076***
(0.011)
0.112**
(0.053)
0.004
(0.008)
0.060
(0.037)
0.003*
(0.001)
0.035***
(0.001)
1.047***
(0.050)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-0.201**
(0.082)
115,319
0.281

0.009
(0.006)
0.076***
(0.011)
0.112**
(0.054)
0.004
(0.008)
0.059
(0.037)
0.003*
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.0002)
0.055***
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-0.199**
(0.082)
115,319
0.281

B.2. Alternative Definitions of Default
We follow Ping and Yang (2009) to redefine default to include loans with a concerned
status, to check the sensitivity of the results to the definition of loan default. Table
5 shows that agriculture-related loans have a consistently higher default rate than
non–agriculture-related loans do. Both BaseIR and FloatIR have a much stronger
positive effect on default than on the previous definition of default. We therefore
conclude that our main findings do not vary due to alternative default definitions.
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Table 5.
Agriculture-Related Loans and Credit Risk – Alternative Definition of Default
We estimate the equation (1): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βARit+γXit+μit by using Ping and Yang (2009) definition, i.e. redefining
default to include loans with “Concerned” status, to check the sensitivity of the results to the definition of loan
default. The table reports marginal effects of regression. The detailed description is reported in Section III. Clusteradjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses. The sample period is 2002-2009.

Variables
AR
MID
LONG
BaseIR
FloatIR
Amount
BulletP
PeriodicP
CustomizedP
Guaranteed
Collateralized
Pledged
Disnotes
Excellent
Averaged
Restricted
Mega
Large
Medium
SOE
CO
SC
AE
LTD
CORP
PRI
FOR
TEMP
RAIN
Year Dummy
Observation
Pseudo R-squared

Marginal Effects

Standard Error

0.0023**
0.0130***
0.0559***
0.0249***
0.1120***
0.0030***
0.0305**
0.0468***
0.0860***
0.0505***
0.0489***
0.0127***
-0.1196***
-0.0675***
-0.0207***
-0.0074***
-0.0241***
-0.0052***
-0.0024***
0.0067***
0.0102***
-0.0111***
0.0028
-0.0122***
-0.0076***
-0.0192***
-0.0231***
0.0049***
0.1130***
Yes
115269
0.330

0.0011
0.0024
0.0210
0.0032
0.0136
0.0003
0.0126
0.0102
0.0308
0.0054
0.0038
0.0038
0.0046
0.0028
0.0014
0.0013
0.0046
0.0017
0.0008
0.0020
0.0028
0.0022
0.0042
0.0014
0.0015
0.0014
0.0014
0.0007
0.0295
-

B.3. Determinants of Default on Agriculture-related Loans
To further investigate the determinants of default on agriculture-related loans, i.e.,
those related to loan contract information and firm-specific characteristics, we run
Equation (2) using the agriculture-related loan subsample.
Table 6 shows that medium-term agriculture-related loans are more likely to
result in default. The same effect is found for long-term loans, however weak.
Generally, our analysis suggests that default increases with loan maturity. The
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higher BaseIR is, the more likely the agriculture-related loan will end up in default,
while FloatIR does not have a significant impact on agriculture-related loan default.
This result is attributed to the vulnerability of the agriculture sector in China;7 i.e.,
the resilience of agriculture-related loans to risk is low, and macroeconomic shocks
can precipitate their default. This finding confirms H2, i.e., monetary policy is an
important systemic risk factor in determining credit risk on loans in China, even
when the loan-specific rate is given and controlled for.
Table 6.
Determinants of default on agriculture-related loans
We estimate the equation (2): Pr(Defaultit=1)=α+βBaseIRit+γFloatIRit+θXit+μit to check the sensitivity of the predicting
variables. The table reports marginal effects of regression. The detailed description is reported in Section III. Clusteradjusted standard errors are presented in parentheses. The sample period is 2002-2009.

Variables
MID
LONG
BaseIR
FloatIR
Amount
BulletP
PeriodicP
CustomizedP
Guaranteed
Collateralized
Pledged
Disnotes
Excellent
Averaged
Restricted
Mega
Large
Medium
SOE
CO
SC
AE
LTD
CORP
PRI
FOR
TEMP
RAIN
Year Dummy
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
7

Marginal Effects

Standard Error

0.0146***
0.0349*
0.0043**
-0.0019
-0.0003*
-0.0012
-0.0005
-0.0002
-0.0015
0.0001
0.0000
-0.0006
-0.0197***
-0.0112***
-0.0034***
-0.0017***
0.0003
-0.0027***
0.0000
0.0039*
-0.0002
-0.0025**
-0.0013*
0.0007
-0.0011
0.0007
0.0038***
0.1497***
Yes
13052
0.209

0.0048
0.0187
0.0020
0.0054
0.0002
0.0082
0.0097
0.0090
0.0064
0.0010
0.0009
0.0010
0.0030
0.0030
0.0009
0.0005
0.0013
0.0008
0.0008
0.0021
0.0014
0.0013
0.0007
0.0009
0.0007
0.0017
0.0009
0.0350

This vulnerability refers to losses due to adverse weather, natural disasters, and the volatility of the
prices of agricultural products.
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Regarding loan contract-specific information, the type of guarantee has no
effect on agriculture-related loan default, as for other types of loan. With respect
to firm-specific information, firm size affects the default rate: mega- and mediumsized firms are found to have lower chances of default. Managerial quality ratings
have a significant effect on default, i.e., borrowers rated as excellent have the
lowest default rate, followed by average borrowers and restricted borrowers,
with knockout borrowers most likely to default. This finding is consistent with
other types of loans. The weather effect is still significant and consistent with non–
agriculture-related loans.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigates agriculture-related loan default in China. Consistent
with our hypotheses, agriculture-related loans are more likely to result in default
than non–agriculture-related loans, after controlling for other factors. The only
exception is when the UN classification is used. This could suggest that agriculturerelated sectors have country-specific characteristics and an international standard
definition is not applicable to single country. An alternative definition of default
does not change the conclusion that agriculture-related loans are more likely to
default than non–agriculture-related loans are. However, such a redefinition of
default generally affects the influence of contract-specific characteristics on the
default of all types of loans.
In the analysis of the determinants of agriculture-related loans, we find that
default increases with maturity. However, unlike other types of loan, long-term
agriculture-related loans do not show a significantly higher credit risk than their
short-term counterparts. This result could be because the agriculture-related
subsample does not encompass as many long-term loans, since financial institutions
engaged in agriculture-related lending do not usually wish to have prolonged
exposure to a single entity. We also find that the higher the base interest rate, the
more likely agriculture-related loans will end up in default, while loan-specific
interest rate fluctuations do not have a significant impact on agriculture-related
loan default. These two findings are consistent with our hypotheses and could be
attributed to the low resilience of the agriculture-related sector to macroeconomic
shocks. Guaranteed and collateralized agriculture-related loans are also more
likely to result in default. This finding suggests that the moral hazard arising from
the introduction of guarantees and collateral requirements could contribute to
the credit risk of agriculture-related loans. Firm-specific characteristics, such as
firm size, the borrower’s managerial quality, and ownership structure also have
a significant influence on the default of agriculture-related loans. Remarkably,
the agriculture-related loans in our sample show a downward trend in default
between 2003 and 2008.
Our findings confirm the concerns of financial institutions that agriculturerelated loans are generally riskier than non–agriculture-related loans.
Policymakers should pay more attention to the impact of macroeconomic policies,
such as monetary policy, on systemic risk in the agriculture-related loan market.
An agriculture-related derivatives market, such as weather derivatives, could be
developed to help agriculture-related businesses better manage their uncontrollable
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss0/7
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risks. For financial institutions, borrower-specific risk characteristics should play
an important role in lending decision, while the design of loan contracts is also
essential. The systematic study of the determinants of agriculture-related loan
default contributes to the literature on the credit risk of loans from a sector that is
critical to the fundamental wellbeing of the world population.
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APPENDIX
Table A1.
Definition of agriculture-related loans – People’s Bank of China Classification
Loan Type Code
1111
1211
1311
1411
1511
1611
1621
1631
1632
1641
1651
1661
1711
1811
2111
2121
2131
2141
2151
2161
2211
2221
9999

Loan Type
Agriculture
Forestry
Livestock farming
Fishing
Service to agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishing
Agricultural infrastructure
Agricultural product processing
Agricultural product export
Circulation of other agricultural material
Agricultural science and technology
Rural area infrastructure
Manufacturing of agricultural tools and equipments
Other agriculture-related
Particular non agriculture-related
Agriculture - individual
Forestry – individual
Livestock farming - individual
Fishing - individual
Service to agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishing - individual
Other individual agricultural activities
Rural student loans
Other rural consumer loans
Other

Table A2.
Definition of agriculture-related loans – China domestic classification
Loan Type Code
A101
A102
A103
A104
A105

Loan Type
Agriculture
Forestry
Livestock farming
Fishing
Service to agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishing
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Table A3.
Definition of agriculture-related loans – UN classification*
Loan Type Code
A011
A012
A013
A014
A021
A022
A023
A031
A032
A033
A034
A039
A041
A042
A051
A052
A053
A054

Loan Type
Grains and other crops planting
Vegetables and horticultural products planting
Fruits, nuts, beverage and fragrance products planting
Herbal medicine crops planting
Trees planting and cultivation
Timber and bamboo logging
Forestry products collection
Livestock breeding
Pig breeding
Poultry breeding
Hunting
Other livestock farming
Sea fishing
Inland fishing
Services to agricultural sector
Services to forestry sector
Services to livestock farming industry
Services to fishing industry

*International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities Rev 4
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